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The outbreak of the 2007-2008 financial crisis and its transformation into a sovereign debt crisis in 
the eurozone, dramatically twisted the assessment of the euro experiment. In November 2007, 
Tumpel-Gugerell, a previous member of the ECB executive board, claimed that the introduction of 
the euro had brought “monetary stability, with low inflation and convergence of long-term interest 
rates towards the low levels”, these facts being “the best support for sustainable economic growth 
and employment”. In 2008, an EU Commission report celebrating the 10-year anniversary of the 
introduction of the euro praised the single currency as a “resounding success”. Just two years later, 
the eruption of financial turbulences surrounding public debt in the “periphery” of the eurozone, 
and the risk of a disintegration of the eurozone itself, radically changed the mind of policy makers 
and economists. According to several experts (Eichengreen, 2014; De Grauwe and Ji, 2015), the euro 
passed from being a “resounding success” to a cause of economic distress. 
The above events triggered two interconnected evolutions in the economic literature. First, since 
2008, the economic discipline has rediscovered the concept of “secular stagnation” (Summers, 
2014a, 2015; Eggertsson and Mehrotra, 2014; Gordon, 2014, 2015) originally coined by Alvin Hansen 
(1934, 1939). Second, even though the concept of secular stagnation has been applied to most post-
crisis developed economies worldwide, the idea of a secular decline has been frequently associated 
with the very meagre economic performance of the euro area in the last 10 years (De Grauwe, 
2016). 
In this paper, we tackle the issue of secular stagnation in the eurozone. We do so by adopting a 
core-periphery perspective. This is a novel contribution of our work with respect to previous papers 
on the same topic. Indeed, several papers have already documented the existence of considerable 
heterogeneity in the development process of eurozone countries. Estrada et al. (2013) and Barkbu 
et al. (2016) stress the lack (or slowdown) of real economic convergence among eurozone countries 
even before the outbreak of the 2007-2008 crisis. Landesmann (2015) and Celi et al. (2018) note 
that when pre-crisis convergence in per-capita GDP occurred (in Greece and Spain, for instance), 
such processes were accompanied by structural (external) imbalances making core-periphery 
catching-up unsustainable and likely to fail in the long run. Consistent with structuralist core-
periphery theory, Simonazzi et al. (2013), Celi et al. (2018), and Grabner et al. (2019, 2020) provide 
evidence about differences in the technological capabilities of European countries. In their views, 
persisting or even increasing intra-European technological gaps significantly contributed to the 
unsustainability of macro convergence among euro countries, to the asymmetric response to 2008 
shock, and eventually to the generation of the eurozone crisis itself, in the periphery of the euro 
area in particular. Despite this evidence, previous work about secular stagnation and/or 
unemployment in the eurozone ignored the possibility that the above two phenomena might be 
somehow related to an unfolding process of uneven development between the core and the 
periphery of the euro area. Our work aims at filling this gap by documenting how structural 
technological differences among core and peripheral eurozone economies, and the way they may 
interact with macro policies, may have ignited (or reinforced) long-run diverging developments in 
the aftermath of the common 2007-2008 financial shock.  
In this paper, we first empirically analyse whether the 2007-2008 financial shock has triggered 
secular stagnation in the core and the periphery of the euro area. Following Jimeno et al. (2014), 
Gordon (2015), Storm (2017) and Crafts (2017), we take the dynamics of potential GDP as the main 
indicator of secular stagnation. Second, we focus on the components of potential GDP that have 
changed the most in the wake of the crisis and that may represent relevant sources of deepening 
core-periphery divergence. The key component that arises from this analysis if the NAIRU, which is 
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the focus for the rest of the paper1.  Our analysis of the determinants of the NAIRU however departs 
from narrow mainstream approaches that focus on supply-side factors, in particular labour market 
institutions, first and foremost. We rather follow Storm and Naastepad (2015a) and Storm (2017) 
by offering a mixed structuralist/post-Keynesian analysis of the variables at stake with the following 
two extra groups of determinants of the NAIRU. Firstly, we analyse the influence of different 
technological capabilities in core and peripheral eurozone countries on the NAIRU.  This follows 
Storm and Naastepad (2015a) who argue that the real problem of peripheral eurozone countries, in 
particular the Southern ones, lies in the lack of non-price competitiveness as “they are locked in to 
lower and middle levels of technology” (Storm and Naastepad, 2015, p. 969). Secondly, we 
investigate the role of demand-side forces in shaping the relative development trajectory of core 
and peripheral eurozone countries, and the way such demand-side factors may have interacted with 
the above-mentioned technological capabilities. Consistent with Stockhammer and Klär (2011) and 
Hemberger at al. (2017), we emphasize the importance of investment demand as a relevant 
determinant of potential GDP growth and of the NAIRU. Differently from them, we extend our 
analysis to the role played by fiscal austerity. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper to 
explore both fiscal austerity and technological capabilities together in an empirical analysis of the 
NAIRU.      
Four different findings of our work are worth mentioning. First, whilst post-crisis secular 
stagnation seems to appear as a concrete reality in the whole eurozone, it is much more acute in 
the periphery. Since 2008, pre-crisis (timid) core-periphery convergence has turned into deep 
structural divergence. Capital accumulation and the level of the NAIRU are the components of 
potential GDP that have been most affected by the recessionary forces triggered by the worldwide 
financial crisis, and which diverged the most afterwards. Since 2008, the NAIRU in the periphery of 
the eurozone has increased substantially, whilst it has slightly decreased or remained constant in 
the core.  
Second, with the exception of active labour market policies, institutional factors affecting the 
functioning of the labour market (i.e., the provision of unemployment benefits, employment 
protection, and trade union density) do not play a consistent, clear or relevant role throughout 
eurozone core and peripheral countries. In general, they seem to be relatively minor determinants 
of potential GDP, and of the NAIRU in particular, with respect to structuralist-type technology and 
demand-side factors.  
Third, the technology capability and, hence, the non-price competitiveness of eurozone 
economies, play an extremely important role in explaining the level of the NAIRU and the ensuing 
dynamics of potential GDP. This is particularly so in the periphery of the eurozone. The structural 
technological weaknesses characterizing these economies significantly contribute to raise their level 
of structural unemployment (making it much higher than that recorded in the core of the eurozone).  
Fourth, structural unemployment and potential GDP are considerably affected by demand-side 
factors. Our analysis first confirms what has already been pointed out by Stockhammer (2004) and 
Stockhammer and Klär (2011): investment demand tends to negatively affect and squeeze the 
NAIRU. More than this, we present two novel findings. Firstly, in the eurozone, tough fiscal 
consolidation has significantly drained aggregate demand and increased the NAIRU. We find a 
significant positive correlation between the NAIRU and fiscal cuts in the public budget. Secondly, 
fiscal policy interacts with the structural (technological) features of peripheral countries themselves. 
We argue that National governments, in the periphery of the eurozone in particular, may have used 
expansionary fiscal policy to respond to and to compensate for the perverse effects that the 
technological weaknesses of the local economy may induce on structural unemployment. The 
	
1 We use the expressions NAIRU and structural unemployment as synonymous throughout the paper. 
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straight jacket imposed on fiscal spending since 2010 may explain why, in the absence of 
expansionary fiscal stances and given the long-lasting nature of intra-European technological gaps, 
the NAIRU increased so massively in peripheral eurozone countries.    
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the concept of secular stagnation and how 
it might be theoretically connected to and empirically analysed by looking at the dynamics of 
potential GDP and of its components. Section 3 illustrates the rationale for the core-periphery 
perspective adopted in this paper by providing evidence of technological gaps among eurozone 
countries. It also addresses the structural effects of the 2007-2008 crisis in the core and the 
periphery of the eurozone. Section 4 points out the respective roles of “mainstream-like” labour 
market institutions, structuralist-type technological factors and, finally, demand-side factors in the 
determination of the NAIRU. Section 5 concludes and drives some policy implications that stem from 
the above findings. 
 
2. Secular stagnation and the dynamics of potential GDP                      
 
The concept of secular stagnation has neither a well-established definition nor a clear method of 
how to measure it. Similarly, a consensus does not exist about its causes and solutions. In 1938, the 
US economist Alvin Hansen defined the “essence of secular stagnation [as] sick recoveries which die 
in their infancy and depressions which feed on themselves and leave a hard and seemingly 
immovable core of unemployment [italics is ours]” (Hansen, 1939, p.4). He had first introduced this 
concept five years earlier however, saying that “the secular stagnation of business [is] incident to 
the accumulation of a surplus of funds unable to find an adequate outlet in profitable investment” 
(Hansen, 1934, p.19).  
Hansen’s reference to saving-investment matching as the possible missing economic adjustment 
leading to secular stagnation may have misdirected most of the recent mainstream contributions 
on secular stagnation from its original meaning, causes and solutions. On the one hand, these works 
take the Wicksellian theory of interest rate-driven adjustments to full employment as the proper 
theoretical framework in order to address the problem of secular stagnation (see Eichengreen, 
2015; Blanchard et al., 2014; Claeys, 2016; Eggertsson et al., 2017). On the other hand, mainstream 
empirical analyses concentrate their attention on estimating the existence of a negative natural 
interest rate as proof of secular stagnation (see Hamilton et al., 2016; Belke and Klose, 2017). A 
critique of these approaches is out of the scope of this paper.2 What it is relevant for our purposes 
is that Hansen himself considered interest rate-led adjustments and the Wicksellian theory to be 
largely irrelevant in order to explain secular stagnation (Hansen, 1939, p.5). According to Hansen, 
the roots of secular stagnation lie in a structural lack of profitable investment opportunities and, 
hence, of an adequate investment demand as caused by structural forces such as the slowdown in 
population growth, a narrowing scope for innovation, the closing of the Western US frontier and a 
lower exploitation of natural resources. 
The concept of potential GDP did not yet exist when Hansen first talked about secular stagnation 
(Gordon, 2014). Nonetheless, the long-run structural perspective characterising Hansen’s view 
makes the association between the idea of secular stagnation and the evolution of potential GDP 
quite straightforward.3 According to Teulings and Baldwin (2014), three different (but rather close) 
approaches have recently emerged after Larry Summers rediscovered secular stagnation in his 2013 
	
2 See Taylor (2017) for a critical analysis of the application of the loanable fund theory to secular stagnation. 
3  An alternative “structural” interpretation of stagnation has been elaborated by some heterodox and Marxian 
economists, who foresaw a permanent decline in the rate of capital accumulation of developed countries due to the 
intrinsic dynamics and contradictions of capitalist economies, i.e., the increase in oligopolistic concentration, a rise in 
the profit margins and an increase in excess capacity. 
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IMF address in honour of Stanley Fischer. The first one, consistent with Gordon (2014), links secular 
stagnation to the decline in the growth rate of potential GDP. The second one focuses on a one-off 
reduction in the level of potential GDP regardless of a possible slowdown in its trend growth. In both 
views, a slowdown in potential GDP is mainly explained by supply-side forces such as a negative 
exogenous shift in the dynamics of productivity or excessive labour market rigidities (causing 
persistent post-crisis increases in the NAIRU). A third Summers-like approach “measures” secular 
stagnation according to the gap between actual and potential GDP.  
In this paper, we analyse post-2008 secular stagnation in the eurozone, and the possibility such 
a phenomenon might have taken different orders of magnitude in the core and the periphery, by 
looking at the dynamics of potential output. We do so for two reasons. First, using the output gap 
as a measure of secular stagnation is highly questionable. As Summers (2014b) himself admits, a 
squeeze in the output gap may actually come from a reduction in potential output itself rather than 
in a rebound in actual output towards its pre-crisis potential trend. Indeed, this is what has 
happened in Japan in the 1990s and, more recently, in the US and EU alike. As a consequence, the 
output gap may well disappear, even though the economy remains depressed with widespread 
unemployment. As we will highlight later on, a leading reason why potential output stagnated or 
even declined in the post-crisis eurozone periphery is precisely because of an increase in the NAIRU. 
Second, we follow Storm (2017) and we depart from the standard mainstream explanation of 
potential GDP as determined by supply side factors related to labour market institutions (or the 
regulation of the goods market). In this paper, we analyse the evolution of potential GDP, and of 
some of its components, by taking on board suggestions from structuralist and post-Keynesian 
theory. In line with structuralist theory, we investigate whether differences in the growth potential 
of eurozone countries may be influenced by differences in their levels of technological capability 
and productive complexity. From post-Keynesian theory, we admit for the possibility that some 
components of potential GDP may be influenced by demand factors. One example of how demand 
may influence potential GDP is through productivity dynamics, which may be positively stimulated 
by a buoyant aggregate demand via Kaldor-Verdoon effects (Storm, 2017).4 This is also the case for 
an endogenous NAIRU that may change due to demand-related factors (Stockhammer, 2004; Ball, 
2009; Stockhammer and Klär, 2011), and show path-dependency with respect to actual 
unemployment (Ball, 2009; Storm and Naastepad, 2015b)5. 
Potential GDP is a theoretical construct that cannot be directly observed from available economic 
data. The definition of potential output commonly adopted by international institutions and 
national economic bodies refers to the maximum quantity of output that can be produced at stable 
inflation. It is usually estimated by applying a standard production function (say a Cobb-Douglas 
production function) to filtered macro data on GDP, capital stock, labour force and Total Factor 
Productivity (TFP). This is explicitly pointed out in equation (1) below, where Y* stands for potential 
output, TFP* and N* represent trends values for Total Factor Productivity and the available labour 
input6 respectivelly, and Kt is the available capital input at time t. In equation (1), u* stands for the 
NAIRU, i.e., the rate of unemployment of the labour force that ensures inflation to remain constant. 
	
4 This perspective seems to be consistent with Hansen’s own view, in particular when he stressed, in the words of 
Backhouse and Boianovsky (2016), that sustained post-Second World War productivity dynamics “could have not 
happened without expansionary fiscal policy [and that] technological progress was probably stimulated by adequate 
aggregate demand, meaning that the actual and potential growth trends are not independent from one another” 
(Backhouse and Boianovsky, 2016, p.958). 
5 The fact that demand shocks may affect the long-run development trajectory of an economy (Dutt, 2006; Dosi et al., 
2010; Dosi et al., 2018), and the determination of an endogenous NAIRU (Stockhammer, 2008), are consolidated pillars 
of post-Keynesian and evolutionary economics now increasingly accepted by mainstream authors as well (Ball, 2014). 
6  Total available labour force is in turn computed as the product between working age population, the average 
participation to the labour force, and a trend value for average worked hours.  
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There are several critiques to the above definition of potential output and to the way it is estimated. 
Palumbo (2015) and Fontanari et al. (2019) criticise the fact that the concept of potential output is 
theoretically biased, as it incorporates the mainstream theory of inflation and unemployment, i.e., 
the NAIRU, and its computation is based on filtered macro data fitted onto a mainstream production 
function. According to them, this approach may impede potential output, as generally intended and 
measured, to correctly gauge the real production potential of an economy and tend to 
systematically underestimate output losses during recessions. Heimberger at al., (2017) note that 
the way the NAIRU is sometimes measured (i.e., by applying some smoothing filters to data about 
actual unemployment) may be inconsistent with the concept of structural unemployment (i.e., the 
level of unemployment caused by institutional factors such as labour market rigidities). These 
critiques are well grounded. Nevertheless, a critical appraisal of the definition and measurement of 
potential GDP and of its components is far beyond the scope of this paper. For the sake of 
comparability with previous mainstream studies of this topic, we maintain the same methodological 
approach. In a way, this is a critique “from inside the mainstream” by starting from the same data 
and estimation techniques used by mainstream analyses. However, the theoretical framework of 
our study is much broader as it embraces relevant insights coming from structuralist core-periphery 
theory and from post-Keynesian economics. This way, we show how economic mechanisms central 
to structuralist and post-Keynesian theory may provide more effective explanations for the 
economic phenomena and the connected data usually interpreted through the narrow lenses of 
mainstream economics. 
 
3. The 2007-2008 financial shock, the dynamics of potential output and secular stagnation in the 
eurozone: A core-periphery perspective 
 
The fact that the last financial crisis may induced a prolonged economic slowdown, if not stagnation, 
in the euro area is not new in the economic literature (Summers, 2014b). Nonetheless, only a few 
works have addressed this issue from an empirical point of view. Anderton et al., (2014) perform a 
detailed empirical analysis of the main components of potential output for the eurozone as a whole 
and detect an unprecedented decline in the speed of capital accumulation and a symmetric increase 
in structural unemployment after 2008. Ollivaud and Turner (2014) conduct a similar analysis for 
OECD countries, eurozone Member States among them, reporting evidence of post 2008 changes 
in potential output for each economy.  
The above contributions provide clear evidence of the possible long-lasting negative effects of 
the 2007-2008 shock on the economy of eurozone countries. However, by analysing the Eurozone 
as whole, they miss the considerable degree of heterogeneity within the monetary union. This is 
not a trivial shortcoming. Indeed, following Storm and Naastepad (2015a) and Celi et al. (2018), the 
fact that eurozone countries responded asymmetrically to a somehow symmetric shock is related 
to the way their different technological capabilities and productive structures interacted with the 
process of monetary integration itself. Since late 1990s until the outbreak of the crisis, quite 
abundant capital flows moved from the core of the eurozone to structurally weaker peripheral 
countries, attracted by (temporarily) higher yields and by the (apparent) disappearance of the 
exchange rate risk. Such capital flows gave rise to economic accelerations in the periphery, and signs 
of core-periphery macro convergence. However, they also fed deepening imbalances. The 
technological gap dividing the periphery of the eurozone from the core, and the lack of non-price 
competitiveness in the periphery, was mirrored by widening current account deficits in the former 
set of countries, and by persistent surpluses in the latter. The financial crisis brought this process to 
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an abrupt end (Merler and Pisani-Ferry, 2012). Sudden stops, capital reversals and the ensuing 
sovereign debt crisis, eventually led to structural adjustment in the periphery, much like those 
frequently observed in the periphery of the world economy since the 1980s. 
The relevance of the technological gap shaping the economic interaction between core and 
peripheral eurozone countries is well documented by the so-called “Cepalitec” index originally 
computed by ECLAC for Latin American countries (ECLAC, 2016). The index takes a simple average 
of two normalized indicators: one related to a country’s export share of medium/high-tech 
engineering-related manufactured goods over total (country) exports (𝐸𝑆()!
* ); the other to the 
number of granted patents per million inhabitants (𝑃𝑇!* ). 7  Equation (2) below formally states 
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In equation (2), “i” stands for countries, whilst “t” indicates time. 𝐸𝑆()!
1*2 (𝐸𝑆()!
134) and 𝑃𝑇!1*2 
(𝑃𝑇!134) stand for the lowest (highest) values of the export and patent sub-indexes registered in 
our sample of countries at time “t”. 
Figure 1 below portrays the evolution of the “TC” index from 1984 to 2018 in core and peripheral 
eurozone countries. Figure 2 offers an indicative measure of the core-periphery technological gap 
as captured by the ratio between weighted averages of “TC” indexes for core and peripheral 
countries8.  
 
[FIGURES 1 and 2 HERE] 
 
The TC index provides a ranking of eurozone countries by technology capability. From Figure 1, it is 
easy to see how, with the partial exception of Ireland in some years, all core economies (black lines 
in Figure 1) are persistently positioned above peripheral countries (red lines in Figure 1) in the 
technological ladder. Greece has permanently remained at the bottom of this technological 
hierarchy, whilst Germany at the top. Figure 2 reveals that there were signs of core-periphery 
technological catching-up before mid-1990s. The technological gap, however, never closed and has 
even diverged since 1996.  Consistent with Simonazzi et al. (2013), and Celi et al. (2018), such a 
newly established technological divergence between core and peripheral eurozone countries is 
linked to the enlargement of the European Union towards East European countries (the so-called 
“catching-up countries” in Grabner et al. (2019)). The relocation of some manufacturing productions 
towards East European countries has in fact partially displaced those in Southern European 
economies, thus pushing their technological capabilities downwards. 
The empirical evidence portrayed by Figures 1 and 2 gives a clear idea of persisting structural 
differences between core and peripheral eurozone countries and explains the rationale for the 
adoption of a core-periphery approach for our analysis of secular stagnation in the eurozone. In this 
paper we adopt a rather “standard” classification of eurozone Member States. We define as 
peripheral economies those hit the most by the 2007-2008 financial shock and/or by the sovereign 
	
7 The inclusion in the TC index of data related to patents alongside to trade statistics is meant to provide a remedy to 
the misleading evaluation of the technological capability characterizing an economy that could possibly emerge by 
considering trade data only. With the spread of global value chains (GVC), a country may well end up exporting goods 
classified as a high-tech, which however represent the low-tech low-skill labour intensive components of much more 
complex products produced elsewhere. The integration of data about the outcome of innovation processes (i.e., 
patents) with trade statistics may offer a more realistic picture of the technology level of an economy.   
8 Weights are countries’ GDP shares over sub-groups (i.e., core and peripheral) totals.  
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debt crisis, i.e., Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece and Spain. We include Austria, Belgium, Finland, 
France, Germany and the Netherlands in the core.  Our classification is different from that one put 
forward by Grabner et al. (2019) because we restrict our analysis to the eurozone only, and not to 
the wider European Union. Moreover, we exclude from our sample very small economies such as 
Luxemburg, Malta and Cyprus, or Eastern economies that joined the eurozone during or after the 
outbreak of the 2007-2008 financial crisis. Furthermore, the inclusion of France among core 
economies is controversial. Celi at al. (2018) document the progressive process of 
“peripheralization” of the French economy since 1980 as due to its industrial decline (of the 
automotive sector, in particular), and the ensuing emergence of persistent external imbalances 
(read current account deficits). Grabel et al. (2019) define France as an intermediate case between 
core and peripheral countries, but eventually include it in the periphery as a consequence of 
widening technological gaps with respect to core economies. In this paper, we take a different 
approach, considering France as a core economy. We do this for three different reasons. First, albeit 
French de-industrialization is undeniable, France’s technological capabilities seem to be closer to 
those of the core than the periphery (see Figure 1). This is likely due to the fact that the TC index we 
compute in this paper does not exclusively rely upon trade statistics as Grabel et al. (2019) do9. 
When data about the outcome of innovation processes are considered as well, France seems to be 
better placed in the technological hierarchy. This view is supported by data about investments in 
R&D and employment in scientific and high-tech sectors (Botta, 2014). Second, the post-2008 
increase in unemployment and slowdown in potential GDP (i.e., the variables at the basis of this 
study) registered in France seem to be much weaker than those recorded in the periphery (Botta et 
al. 2018). They are more aligned to the data of Centre-North eurozone countries. Third, in the 
aftermath of the 2007-2008 shock, France has not been exposed to acute financial turbulences 
and/or did not have to rely on bail-out programs. The leeway for expansionary fiscal policy has been 
significantly larger than in the periphery.  
Given such classification, we have collected data for potential GDP and its components from 1998 
to 2017 for all the countries in the sample.10 The statistical information comes from AMECO and 
Eurostat datasets. Consistent with the above-mentioned production function technique, we have 
then computed average annual growth rates for the following components of potential GDP: trend 
TFP growth; net capital formation and the growth rate of working age population. We have finally 
taken average levels of labour force participation and the NAIRU. After constructing the dataset, we 
have computed simple averages for the core and the periphery for the sub-periods from 1999 to 
2008 and from 2009 to 2017. We have checked for the occurrence of any structural break from one 
period to the other, and between core and periphery economies, by performing a two sample t-test 
on computed averages for all the variables at stake. The results of this analysis are reported in Tables 
1.a-1.f below. 
From Table 1.a, pre-crisis potential growth in the periphery was slightly higher, although not 
statistically different, with respect to what was recorded in the core. The outbreak of the crisis gave 
rise to a considerable and statistically significant drop in potential growth in both sets of countries. 
If we take a reduction in potential GDP growth as a sign of secular stagnation, both the core and 
periphery of the eurozone exhibit signs of secular decline post-2007/2008. The reduction in the 
periphery, however, has been much more pronounced (indeed around 2.5 times deeper) than the 
decline registered in the core of the euro area. Whilst potential growth in the core is still positive 
	
9 Grabel et al. (2019) try to assess the technological trajectory of European countries by combining changes in countries’ 
exports of different types of goods with the corresponding product complexity index as computed by Hildalgo and 
Hausmann (2009). The product complexity index itself hinges upon the concept of revealed comparative advantages 
computed on the basis of trade statistics about relative export shares.   
10 Data for Ireland run from 1999 to 2014 only due to a change in statistical methodology thereafter.  
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(albeit 1.1 percentage points lower than pre-crisis average), potential output dynamics has turned 
negative in the periphery. As a consequence, from 2009 to 2017, there is solid empirical evidence 
for core-periphery divergence in the evolution of potential output. 
When it comes to the components of potential output, our results show that capital 
accumulation (see Table 1.b) and TFP growth (see Table 1.c) have been significantly (and negatively) 
affected by the financial crisis in both peripheral and core economies. Once again, reductions in the 
periphery have been as large as or deeper than what was observed in the core. Capital accumulation 
was significantly faster in the periphery than in the core from 1999 to 2008 - a positive sign of intra-
eurozone convergence. In the wake of the financial crisis, however, things have reversed, with core 
countries now investing much more than what economic actors do in the periphery. As to TFP 
growth, the dynamics of productivity has been persistently higher in the core than in the periphery 
both before and after the financial shock. This may be taken as additional evidence of the 
“structural” core-periphery divide that peripheral economies have never managed to reduce, and 
that is at least in part due to their persisting productive specialization in relatively low-tech 
industries with reduced scope for innovation and productivity growth, compared to the medium-
high tech sectors at the centre of core economies’ productive systems (Storm and Naastepad, 2015b 
and 2016; Celi et al., 2018). What is however different, and certainly worrisome, with respect to 
pre-crisis dynamics is that post-2009 TFP average growth in the periphery of the eurozone has 
turned negative. 
Table 1.d shows another interesting part of the story of euro area core-periphery divergence. 
Before the 2007-2008 financial shock, core and peripheral countries recorded similar rates of 
working age population growth. Indeed, this variable was slightly higher in the periphery but not 
statistically different with respect to what was observed in the core. On the contrary, post crisis 
trends are statistically different and show different signs between the core and the periphery. 
Whilst working age population has kept on growing in core economies (albeit at a lower rate), it has 
declined in the periphery. This outcome should not come as a surprise. Indeed, it is consistent with 
the increasing evidence of intra-euro area migration, with part of the labour force in the periphery 
moving towards core economies in search for better employment opportunities (Fries-Tersch et al., 
2016). Whilst, on the one hand, this fact may partially alleviate the problem of mass unemployment 
in certain peripheral countries (see Greece and Spain in particular), it stands out as an additional 
factor of divergence when periphery-to-core migration, especially high-skill workers’ migration, 
gives rise to a brain drain from the former in favour of the latter. 
 
[TABLES 1.A – 1.F HERE] 
 
Last but not least, Table 1.f portrays the results of our two-sample t-test analysis related to 
structural unemployment. As Table 1.f clearly shows, structural unemployment rates have been 
persistently higher in the periphery than in the core regardless of whether we are looking at the 
period before or after the crisis.  Before the outbreak of the 2007-2008 financial crisis, NAIRU rates 
were, on average, 3 percentage points higher in peripheral eurozone countries than in core 
economies, this difference being statistically significant. This fact notwithstanding, it is worth noting 
that such a gap has significantly widened in the post-crisis period. On the one hand, average NAIRU 
rates have slightly decreased in core economies, with no sign of a structural break being recorded. 
On the other hand, structural unemployment has remarkably increased in peripheral countries by 
around 3 percentage points. The statistically relevant dimension of this change suggests that a 
perverse structural break in the level of structural unemployment has indeed occurred in the 
periphery following the financial and sovereign debt crisis. 
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Once accepted that changes in the NAIRU may play a significant role in determining the level, if 
not the growth rate, of potential output (see Anderton et al., 2014), it is important to determine 
which factors lie behind structural unemployment itself. This is even the more so in the context of 
our analysis, since opposite post-crisis variations in structural unemployment have increasingly 
divided the eurozone periphery from core economies. Such analysis is also relevant from the point 
of view of EU policy-making and institutional reforms. Most European institutions have so far 
interpreted the long-lasting rise in structural unemployment and decline in potential output as 
consequences of market rigidity, perhaps interacting with the real-side economic effects of the 
financial shock (ECB Task force, 2012; Masuch et al., 2018). Accordingly, they have increasingly 
pushed for the introduction of structural reforms, i.e. deregulation of domestic labour markets, in 
the periphery with the hope of restoring international competitiveness (via internal devaluation) 
and reducing structural unemployment (ECB, 2015). However, several contributions have 
recognised demand-related factors as relevant determinants of the NAIRU (Ball, 2009; 
Stockhammer and Klär, 2011; Jump and Stockhammer, 2019). In the next section we will address 
this point by testing which factors have contributed most to the recent dynamics of structural 
unemployment in the core and in the periphery of the eurozone. More than that, we will test for 
the role played by persisting differences in euro countries’ technological capabilities in the 
determination of diverging core-periphery economic trajectories. 
 
4. Secular stagnation and the NAIRU in core and peripheral eurozone countries 
 
There are contesting theories about the determinants of the NAIRU. In this section, we test the 
contribution of these alternative theories in the core and the periphery of the eurozone. Our 
econometric analysis extends the previous empirical contributions by Stockhammer and Klär (2011), 
and Heimberger et al., (2017). We estimate a model with four sets of explanatory variables. First, 
we consider institutional labour market-related variables. According to mainstream theory, these 
factors might have an effect on structural unemployment by increasing the rigidity of the labour 
market. Second, we consider a range of “macro shock” variables (Blanchard and Wolfers, 2000; 
Stockhammer and Klär, 2011) such as the long-run real interest rate, changes in terms of trade, and 
the TFP growth rate. The first macro shock variable may contribute to structural unemployment via 
demand-side mechanisms by affecting capital accumulation and as the variable captured the 
uneven effects of ECB monetary policy. Terms of trade and TFP shocks are usually interpreted as 
supply shocks that may have an effect on the NAIRU via wage bargaining and/or price setting rules. 
In the specific context of the eurozone, the terms of trade variable may also control for the relative 
importance of price-competitiveness in influencing economic performance, and hence structural 
unemployment, in core and peripheral economies. Third, the “Keynesian” demand side components 
of our analysis are represented by investment demand, as measured by the gross rate of capital 
formation, and the fiscal policy stance, here gauged by the cyclically adjusted primary balance. 
Whilst the inclusion of the former is standard practice in the analyses about structural 
unemployment, the consideration of a fiscal policy variable is a novel contribution. After 2010, the 
implementation of fiscal austerity has been a distinguishing feature of policy making in the 
eurozone. By incorporating a fiscal policy variable in our econometric analysis, we test whether fiscal 
retrenchments, together with the decline in capital accumulation, may have led to increased 
structural unemployment, depressed potential output and, eventually, secular stagnation. Last but 
not least, we further extend the set of variables explaining structural unemployment by considering 
country-specific technological capabilities. The technological level of an economy obviously 
influences its supply side but through a different mechanism to the labour market factors 
pinpointed by mainstream theory. Rather, it effects the accumulation of knowledge and the 
	 11 
evolution of the productive structure of an economy and therefore the non-price competitiveness 
of country. According to structuralist-evolutionary theories, these are the most relevant factors 
behind economic success or decline. The large gap in the technological capabilities of core and 
peripheral eurozone economies we document above makes the analysis of the role of technology 
in the determination of eurozone core-periphery divergency of paramount importance. 
 
4.1 Data and estimation methodology 
 
The data for institutional factors is based on the OECD dataset about labour market variables. In 
order to keep data source homogeneity as high as possible, we also use the OECD estimations for 
the NAIRU and TOTS shocks. Data for the long-term real interest rate, capital accumulation and TFP 
growth are in turn collected from AMECO. None of the abovementioned datasets provide data for 
cyclically adjusted primary balances (CAPB) over a sufficiently long time period. Hence, we calculate 
CAPB in the eurozone as structural government budget balance minus net interest payments, as a 
ratio to potential GDP, using data provided by the IMF.  
In this paper, we extend the period of analysis in Heimberger et al., (2017), which covered the 
period from 1985 to 2012. Our baseline regression model uses data for the period of 1985-2014. 
2014 is the last year for which comprehensive information about labour market institutions are 
available. Due to the lack of data for CAPBs for the full sample, estimations including CAPB is based 
on an unbalanced dataset.  
Before proceeding with the estimation of the model, we first checked for the presence of unit 
roots. Results from the Fisher test11 (see Table A.1 in the Appendix) reject the null hypothesis for 
the presence of unit roots at 1 percent confidence level for all the variables but Employment Labour 
Protection measures (EmP). In the case of EmP, the null hypothesis is rejected at 5 percent 
confidence level. Panel data may also be characterised by cross-sectional heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation. In order to check for these features, we run the Woolridge, Pearson and LR 
Maximum likelihood tests (see Table A.2). They all confirm the presence of heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation. As a consequence, we follow Orlandi (2012) and Heimberger et al. (2017) and adopt 
an Ordinary Least Square Panel Data Corrected Standard Error (OLS-PCSE) estimation method. 
According to Beck and Katz (1995), this methodology is well suited when dealing with panel data 
where the time dimension is not much larger than the cross-section size. It ensures that our 
estimations and significance analysis are appropriately corrected for the presence of 
autocorrelation. In the same vein, for the sake of comparability, we also maintain a similar structure 
of the regression model with respect to the above-mentioned works, as well as to Blanchard and 
Wolfers (2000), and Stockhammer and Klär (2011). 
Equation (3) below shows the full model we estimate to analyse the determinants of structural 
unemployment in the core and peripheral eurozone countries: 
 
𝑁𝐴𝐼𝑅𝑈!" = 𝛼𝐿𝑀𝐼!" + 	𝛽𝑀𝑆!" + 𝜆𝑇𝐶!" + 𝛾𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑈!" + 𝛿#𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐵!" +	𝛿$𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐵!" ∗ 𝑑%&!' + 𝛿(𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐵!" ∗ 𝑑)*& + 𝜃#𝐹𝐸! + 𝜃$𝐹𝐸" + 𝑒!"              (3) 
 
LMIit is a vector of labour market institutions for country i in time t including employment protection 
legislation (EmP), active labour market policies (ALMP), trade union density (UnD), and the 
	
11 As our panel is unbalanced and we have a relatively large T to N, the Fisher unit root test is the most appropriate (see 
Maddala and Wu, 2002). We include a drift term as the mean for each variable for any country is non-zero. We also 
include a demean term to remove cross sectional means. The null hypothesis is that all panels’ series are non-stationary. 
This follows the same strategy adopted by Orlandi (2012) and Heimberger et al. (2017) in the previous empirical 
literature on the NAIRU. 
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unemployment benefit replacement rate (UBR)12. Table A.3 in the Appendix provides a detailed 
description of the variables and data sources. MSit is the vector of macro shock variables (i.e., the 
level of the real long-term interest rate (LTI), the growth rate of total factor productivity (TFP), and 
the growth rate of terms of trade (TOTS)). TCit is the technology capability index13. Finally, ACCUit 
and CAPBit represent the demand-side factors: capital accumulation and fiscal policy stance, 
respectively. The fiscal policy variable is also interacted with the dummy variable dcris, which is equal 
to 1 during 2008-2010, and zero otherwise. At the peak of the financial crisis, eurozone governments 
implemented costly bail-out plans of financial institutions. These measures led to deep public 
deficits and significantly worsened CAPB without preventing a rise in unemployment (they might 
have tamed its increase with respect to the “hypothetical” counterfactual scenario with no bail-out) 
14. A “spurious” negative correlation between a lower CAPB and a higher NAIRU is likely to emerge 
in the midst of the financial crisis. The interaction dummy checks for the significance of this possible 
bias and helps to remove it from the causal relation between fiscal policy and the NAIRU that would 
emerge in “normal” times. Following Stockhammer and Klär (2011), Orlandi (2012) and Heimberger 
et al. (2017), we also include period-fixed effects (FEt) and country-fixed effects (FEi). 
 
4.2 Estimation results 
   
We estimate four different specifications. The first set of estimations (I.A – I.C) includes labour 
market institutions only. Specification (I.A) refers to the full sample of eurozone countries. 
Specification (I.B), in turn, focuses on core economies, whilst Specification (I.C) looks at peripheral 
eurozone countries. Results from this first set of regressions are reported in Table 2. A second set 
of Specifications (II.A – II.C in Table 3) adds our structuralist-type technological capability index to 
the set of mainstream labour market factors. In regressions (II.A – II.C) we thus test for the relative 
importance of different types of supply-side factors. Once again, we run this regression for the full 
sample of countries (II.A), as well as for the core (II.B) and the periphery (II.C) separately. 
Specification (III) further expands the set of explanatory factors by considering macro-shock 
variables and capital accumulation (see Table 4). Finally, Specification (IV) introduces the fiscal 
policy variable. Due to the reduced availability of observations, we run this regression for the full 
sample only. However, we include in the regression an additional dummy variable (dper) which, once 
interacted with CAPB, may capture periphery-specific effects of fiscal austerity (see Table 5). 15 
The results in Table 2 suggest that labour market institutions play some role in explaining the 
evolution of structural unemployment. In some cases, however, our findings contradict the 
expectations of mainstream theory. Employment protection policies, for instance, have a 
statistically significant negative effect on the NAIRU for the full sample (I.A), i.e. the tougher the 
	
12 Previous empirical works also include the tax wedge in this set of institutional variables. Tax wedge data from the 
OECD only goes back to the year 2000. One option would be to compute a longer series by splicing this data with an 
older tax wedge series found in the Bassanini and Duval (2006) dataset, along the lines of Orlandi (2012). However, the 
Bassanini and Duval (2006) dataset does not have historical tax wedge data for Greece, a key peripheral country, and 
so we have left this institutional variable out of the analysis.  
13 In our regression model, we use a modified version of the technological index as defined in equation (1). Each sub-
component of the technological index is scaled down by its sample average and not standardized. This way, whilst the 
technology-based ranking of countries does not change, we can appropriately consider both the cross-section and time 
variability of the technological variable.  
14 The public bailout of private financial institutions certainly helped not to precipitate the financial crisis in an even 
deeper recession. Yet, those measures were not meant, by themselves, to stimulate aggregate demand and, therefore, 
to reduce unemployment. 
15 We only run regressions (IV.A – IV.C) on the full sample, as we do not have enough observations in order to run them 
on the core and periphery separately. Due to a lack of CAPB observations in the periphery, we would only have 89 
observations.  
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measures protecting employment are (i.e., the more rigid the labour market is), the lower the 
structural unemployment is. When the specification is estimated separately for the core and 
peripheral economies, the coefficient is still negative albeit statistically insignificant. 
 
[TABLE 2 HERE] 
 
The effects of the other institutional variables are more in line with the standard mainstream theory. 
Active labour market policies have a significant negative impact on structural unemployment in all 
three specifications in Table 2. Trade union density and the level of unemployment benefits appear 
to increase structural unemployment. However, trade union density is statistically significant only 
in the full sample regression (I.A). Unemployment benefits are statistically significant in the full 
sample and in the “core economies” (I.B) only, but is insignificant in the periphery. 
Table 3 reports the results we obtain when the baseline “mainstream” analysis is extended to 
include the technological index and hence the more “heterodox” supply-side factor. Our results tell 
us that technological capabilities display the expected negative effect on the NAIRU. An increase in 
the technological capability and, hence, in non-price competitiveness of an economy tends to 
reduce structural unemployment. This effect seems to be statistically significant for the regression 
over the full sample, and for the periphery in particular. It is not significant, albeit with the correct 
sign, for core countries only. This fact could be related to a sort of threshold effect in the 
accumulation of technology: its virtuous effects over structural unemployment may tend to weaken 
once a certain level of technological capability is achieved.  
  
[TABLE 3 HERE] 
 
The inclusion of the technological capability index in our regression also brings some changes in the 
effects carried out by some labour market institutions. In the periphery, the coefficients for trade 
union density (UD) and for the unemployment benefits (UnB) become negative and statistically 
significant. A possible explanation for this is that in technologically weaker and less competitive 
economies, labour market institutions that help to increase wages, union density and 
unemployment benefits among them, stand out as relevant contributors to domestic sources of 
aggregate demand and to the generation of employment (i.e., a negative effect of (UD) and (UnB) 
over the NAIRU). At the same time, low technology levels may be associated with lower levels of 
union density and unemployment benefits. The inclusion of the technological capability index in our 
regression analysis may help to capture the interplay of these conflicting forces16. 
In Table 4, we report the results from the expanded regressions (III.A – III.F) where, following 
Stockhammer and Klär (2011) and Heimberger et al. (2017), macro shocks variables and capital 
accumulation are added to labour market institutions. In the last three columns of Table 4, 
regressions (III.D – III.F) also consider the technological capability index.  
 
[TABLE 4 HERE] 
 
	
16 This finding is consistent with Storm and Naastepad (2015a) when they stress the crucial role played by domestic 
aggregate demand for the economic performance of technologically weaker eurozone countries. It is also in line with 
Hartmann et al. (2017), who find that higher levels of economic complexity reduce inequality by feeding stronger 
workers’ unions and the development of labour market institutions conducive to higher wage standards. Finally, our 
results may identify additional “structural” factors influencing the determination of unemployment benefits, this time 
related to the technological level of a country, with respect to those pinpointed by Di Tella and MacCulloch (2002).       
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Consistent with Stockhammer and Klär (2011) and Heimberger et al. (2017), capital accumulation 
always displays a negative and statistically significant effect on the NAIRU through all the 
regressions. This confirms that demand-side factors captured by capital accumulation is a key 
determinant of structural unemployment. 
The coefficient associated to the long-term real interest rate (LTI) is positive and statistically 
significant in full sample regressions (III.A and III.D). This outcome is consistent with economic 
theory: an increase in the long-term real interest rate may discourage capital accumulation and 
hence, increase structural unemployment. When we split the sample into core and periphery, 
results are more nuanced. LTI’s coefficients remain positive and significant in the periphery 
(regressions III.C and III.F). LTI’s effects become insignificant (and with a negative sign) in the core. 
We interpret these results as evidence of diverging financial and monetary conditions in periphery 
and core eurozone countries since 2008. In core economies, net capital inflows partially related to 
the repatriation of capital previously invested in the periphery led to reduced, even negative, long-
term interest rates, while the periphery suffered from financial turmoil and the sovereign debt crisis. 
Implicitly, our results seem thus to suggest that the ECB’s monetary policy was initially ineffective 
in avoiding the fragmentation of eurozone financial markets and in levelling the “financial” playing 
field among core and peripheral eurozone countries. Such core-periphery financial asymmetry likely 
contributed to deepen economic stagnation in the periphery. 
The terms of trade variable TOTS is always insignificant (and with mixed signs) throughout all the 
regressions. Contrary to what claimed by Sinn (2014) and consistent with Storm and Naastepad 
(2015a), this could be taken as sign of the irrelevance of price-competition in explaining economic 
decline in the periphery. Technological capabilities and, hence, factors influencing non-price 
competitiveness seem to be of paramount importance in the periphery instead. The coefficient 
associated to the TC index remains strongly negative and significant in regression (III.F), whilst it is 
insignificant for the full sample (with the expected negative sign) and in the core (with a wrong 
positive sign).  
Finally, the effects of some labour market institutions are not robust and often at odds with what 
mainstream theory would expect. Active labour market policies (AlmP) is the only one consistently 
displaying the expected negative effect over the NAIRU. Employment protection policies (EmP), 
instead, are insignificant in most of the regressions. More interestingly, the inclusion of 
technological capabilities in our regressions seems to reveal a deep asymmetry in the way Trade 
union density (UD) and unemployment benefits (UnB) influence structural unemployment in the 
core and in the periphery. Whilst higher values for (UD) and (UnB) tend to increase the NAIRU in the 
core, the opposite happens in the periphery. The rationale for this result could be connected again 
to Storm and Naastepad (2015a). In technologically weaker economies, domestic sources of 
demand play a leading role in the generation of employment opportunities. As a consequence, 
stronger union density and more generous unemployment benefits, by perhaps increasing the wage 
share, could stimulate economic recovery and reduce the NAIRU. Instead, policies aiming at internal 
devaluation may actually exacerbate economic stagnation and unemployment. In the end, our 
results suggest that the role played by labour market institutions in influencing structural 
unemployment cannot be taken in isolation from other fundamental (supply-side) factors such as 
the level of technological and productive development characterizing an economy. 
Table 5 presents the results obtained when the full list of explanatory factors is considered, and 
CAPB is included alongside to capital accumulation as additional fiscal policy-related demand side 
variable.    
 
[TABLE 5 HERE] 
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In regressions (IV.A) and (IV.B), the coefficient associated to the fiscal policy variable display the 
expected positive sign. Discretionary fiscal contractions, i.e., increases in the cyclically adjusted fiscal 
primary balance, tend to raise the NAIRU. Once again, demand side factors matter in the 
determination of structural unemployment. It is even the more so in the periphery of the eurozone. 
The Wald test confirms that the overall contractionary effects of fiscal austerity in the periphery 
(i.e., d1 + d3 = (0.155; 0.152)) is statistically different from zero. This result can be taken as 
complementary to the findings of De Long and Summers (2012), and Fatas and Summers (2018) 
about the permanent effects of fiscal consolidations on actual and potential GDP. It also provides 
direct support to Jump and Stockhammer (2019) when they claim that demand shocks likely affect 
structural unemployment.  
In Table 5, the interacted dummy variable CAPB*dcrisis for the peak years of the financial crisis is 
statistically significant with the expected negative sign. This means that the financial shock may give 
rise to a spurious relation between CAPB and structural unemployment in those years. The crisis 
jointly led to the deterioration of the cyclically adjusted primary balance through bail-outs to the 
financial sector, and to the increase of unemployment. 
The introduction of the fiscal policy variable in regressions (IV.A) and (IV.B) significantly reduces 
the coefficient associated to capital accumulation (see regressions (III.A) and (III.C)). It remains 
negative and statistically significant, but with a much lower absolute value. This may be due to the 
fact that discretionary fiscal contractions may directly curtail public investment and, hence, cause a 
rise in the NAIRU. Furthermore, in a recession, fiscal stimuli may tame the reduction in economic 
activity and encourage entrepreneurs. Fiscal retrenchments may instead exacerbate the recession 
and spread “pessimistic” expectations, leading business to downsize investment further and cause 
an escalation in structural unemployment. 
When the technological capability index TC is included in our final regressions together with 
CAPB, its coefficient becomes significantly smaller in absolute value and statistically irrelevant 
(albeit with the “correct” negative sign). To investigate further this result, we introduce in regression 
(IV.C) an interaction between TC and CAPB. Our hypothesis is simple: less technologically complex  
countries may tend to compensate structurally lower employment opportunities offered by a 
relatively underdeveloped productive system with more expansionary discretional fiscal policies 
(say, more public employment)17. Our findings tend to confirm this hypothesis. In the periphery, the 
overall direct effect of austerity measures (d1 + d3 = – 0.128 + 0.219 = 0.091) remains positive. The 
Wald test suggests this effect might be weakly insignificant with a borderline p-value equal to 0.12 
very close to 0.1. Given the considerable variability of macro data over the time span taken into 
account, this could be taken as a roughly solid confirmation that fiscal policy is important for the 
determination of structural unemployment.  
Last but not least, the interacted term between CAPB and TC is positive and significant.18 A lower 
value for TC may induce eurozone countries to run discretional fiscal expansions. The need for a 
compensatory stance by fiscal policy for the structural weaknesses of the economy is obviously 
lower in more technology advanced core countries. They can take much more neutral fiscal stances. 
We take the possible interaction between the structural technological conditions of an economy 
	
17 More formally, in regression (IV.C) we test for the following relation: 𝑁𝐴𝐼𝑅𝑈 = 𝛼 ∗ 𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐵(𝑇𝐶) + 𝛽 ∗ 𝑇𝐶, with a > 0; 
b < 0 and (𝜕𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐵 𝜕𝑇𝐶)⁄ > 0. In this context, the “direct” negative effect that lower technological capabilities might 
have on structural unemployment could be at least partially compensated by the “indirect” compensation carried out 
via fiscal policy.  
18	There is a clear correlation between CAPB and TC in the data. A simple pooled regression of CAPB and TC has positive 
and significant coefficient at the 1% significant level. In the sake of space, we did not include this evidence in the paper. 
Please contact authors for details. 	
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and the implementation of expansionary/restrictive (fiscal) macro policy as an interesting new topic 
that deserves further investigation in future research. 
 
4.3 Interaction between economic shocks and labour market institutions 
 
Mainstream theory considers the interaction between economic shocks and rigid labour market 
institutions as a possible relevant source of increases in structural unemployment (Blanchard and 
Wolfers, 2000; Blanchard et al., 2006). When a negative economic shock takes place, actual 
unemployment increases. In presence of rigid labour market institutions, such an increase may last 
long eventually raising structural unemployment. 
In order to test this effect, we conduct an empirical analysis similar, in spirit, to that performed 
by Blanchard and Wolfers (2000). We take 5-year average values of actual unemployment rates19 
for a sample of eurozone countries20 before and after the financial shock.  We then run a simple 
correlation analysis between the degree of rigidity in labour market institutions at the beginning of 
the crisis (i.e. 2008), and the absolute change between pre- and post-crisis unemployment. 21 
According to Blanchard and Wolfers (2000), we would expect a stronger increase in (average) 
unemployment rates in those countries characterized by more rigid labour market institutions when 
the shock struk the real economy. Pre-crisis unemployment averages are computed over the period 
2003-2007, whilst post-crisis averages run from 2010 to 2014. The results are portrayed in Figures 
3 to 6 below. 
 
 [FIGURES 3 – 6 HERE] 
 
The results challenge mainstream expectations. For instance, the countries providing the 
unemployed with larger unemployment benefits seem to have experienced lower post-crisis 
increases (or even small reduction) in average unemployment rates. This may reflect the positive 
demand effects of unemployment benefits, which may have offset the negative effects of the crisis. 
The same applies to the case of trade union density. Again this may reflect the role of unions in 
accepting wage concessions in return for preserving employment, which in turn stabilizes 
unemployment in a recession. More relevantly, our analysis suggest that labour market institutions 
at the time of the crisis have very poor explanatory power, if any, of the pre-post crisis change in 
unemployment records. The R squares associated to the four correlations portrayed in Figures 1 to 
4 are all very small. Hence, cross-country variance in labour market institutions in 2008 explains a 
negligible part of cross-country variance in pre/post crisis unemployment dynamics. 
As a robustness check, we have repeated this analysis by taking into account countries’ 
deviations from cross-country average values (as in Blanchard and Wolfers (2000)). The results do 
	
19 In this section of the paper, we use data about actual unemployment rates rather than about the NAIRU in order to 
stay as close as possible to the original line of reasoning and empirical analysis put forward by Blanchard and Wolfers 
(2000). For the same reason, we take 5-year average values of unemployment as dependent variable in our correlation 
analysis. 
20 In order to have more observations and make our analysis more reliable, we extended the sample of eurozone 
countries to include small economies (Luxemburg) and “latecomers” eurozone member countries (Estonia, Slovenia and 
Slovakia) for which data about labour market institutions are available. 
21 The focus of the final section of our work is restricted to the effects that the 2007-2008 financial crisis might have 
caused on structural unemployment in eurozone countries by interacting with rigid labour market institutions. The time 
and spatial horizons of our analysis are much narrower, the number of observations available smaller, and, as a 
consequence, the statistical method we adopt simpler. The simple correlation analysis we present here is to intend as 
a “prime-facie” empirical evidence of the role of the interaction between a (specific) economic shock and country-
specific labour market institutions in determining recent changes in unemployment.    
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not change. Whilst we now obtain a positive correlation between unemployment benefits and 
pre/post crisis changes in average unemployment (i.e. deviation from sample mean), the 
explanatory power of all four labour market institution variables remains minimal (or even 
decreases). After all, heterogeneity in labour market institutions across the eurozone does not 




In this paper, we address the problem of secular stagnation, and the connected evolution of 
structural unemployment, in the eurozone in the aftermath of the 2007-2008 financial and 
economic crisis. We adopt a core-periphery perspective to address this issue. We do so in order to 
analyse whether secular stagnation manifested itself with different degrees of intensity in the core 
and the periphery of the eurozone as a consequence of their technological and productive 
asymmetries. 
We find that secular stagnation, i.e. a statistically significant slowdown in the dynamics of 
potential GDP, is a eurozone-wide problem. The depth of the problem, however, differs remarkably 
in the core and in the periphery, and the emergence of diverging trends is clear. After 2008, the 
dynamics of potential GDP slowed down dramatically more in peripheral countries than in the core. 
In the same vein, whilst structural unemployment did change in the latter, it has risen dramatically 
in the former. Post-crisis NAIRU in the periphery is now twice that observed in the core. 
Given this evidence, we then investigate the determinants of structural unemployment in both 
sets of countries. Capital accumulation is always significant in all specifications and in all sets of 
eurozone countries. On top of this, fiscal policy also matters. In normal times, austerity measures 
may increase the NAIRU directly, by cutting public investment, and indirectly, by depressing 
entrepreneurs’ animal spirits and private investment even further. Both facts show that demand-
side factors might be extremely relevant, if not major determinants of structural unemployment. 
Moreover, supply-side factors matter. However, they are quite different from those most 
commonly spotted by mainstream theory. In this paper, we find that the technology and productive 
capabilities of an economy, hence its non-price competitiveness, are fundamental to explain 
structural unemployment, in particular in structurally more fragile peripheral countries. These 
factors may determine the NAIRU by also affecting fiscal policy decisions and by “reshaping” the 
way some labour market institutions affect structural unemployment itself. In this sense, labour 
market institutions, when significant, do not display consistent effects on the NAIRU throughout 
core and peripheral economies, and their effects may often be at odds with what is suggested by 
mainstream theory. For instance, stronger union density and more generous unemployment 
benefits may help to reduce the NAIRU in peripheral economies. 
The above findings bring a number of important policy implications. First, eurozone cross-country 
heterogeneity in labour market institutions does not explain much, if anything, of cross-country 
post-crisis heterogeneous changes in unemployment records and potential GDP dynamics. What 
seems to be more relevant, at least for peripheral countries, are the level of technological and 
productive development, and the macro conditions enabling such countries to implement 
expansionary policies boosting demand. In structurally (i.e. technologically) weaker peripheral 
economies, internal demand is relatively more important than external demand as a source of 
employment and economic dynamics. As a consequence, the exposure of peripheral eurozone 
countries to much tougher financial turbulences and the implementation of fiscal austerity explain 
most part of post-crisis eurozone core-periphery divergence. Second, the persistent emphasis of EU 
institutions on labour market deregulation as the main way to reduce the NAIRU and “homogenize” 
it across eurozone countries looks misplaced and even counterproductive. In our view, two different 
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sets of policies are far more urgent and important. On the one hand, the asymmetric responses of 
core and peripheral eurozone countries to common shocks have their roots in long-lasting 
differences in technological and productive capabilities. If so, it is of paramount importance to first 
reduce the core-periphery technological gap via long-term industrial policies in order to then be 
able to implement common labour market and macro policy. On the other hand, European policy 
makers should better look at reforms ensuring homogeneous macro-financial conditions across 
eurozone countries, and avoid the exposure of the periphery to fierce financial turbulences. The 
completion of the eurozone banking union and the creation of a central fiscal authority are 
obviously in order. Such macro reforms, together with industrial policies targeting the persisting 
eurozone core-periphery technological gap, are the only credible responses to the centrifugal forces 
(and the ensuing uneven development), that were dormant before 2008 and the financial shock 
helped to awake.  
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Tables and Figures 
 
Table 1.A. Potential GDP growth rate: pre-crisis (1999-2008) and post-crisis (2009-2017) structural 
break analysis and core-peripheral gap. 

































Source: Authors’ computation on the basis of data from AMECO dataset (2018)    
 
 
Table 1.B. Net capital stock growth rate: pre-crisis (1999-2008) and post-crisis (2009-2017) 
structural break analysis and core-peripheral gap. 































Source: Authors’ computation on the basis of data from AMECO dataset (2018) 
 
 
Table 1.C. Trend TFP growth rate: pre-crisis (1999-2008) and post-crisis (2009-2017) structural break 
analysis and core-peripheral gap. 





























Source: Authors’ computation on the basis of data from AMECO dataset (2018) 
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Table 1.D. Working age population growth rate: pre-crisis (1999-2008) and post-crisis (2009-2017) 

































Source: Authors’ computation on the basis of data from AMECO dataset (2018) 
 
 
Table 1.E. Labour force participation rate: pre-crisis (1999-2008) and post-crisis (2009-2017) 
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within sample 
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Source: Authors’ computation on the basis of data from AMECO dataset (2018) 
 
 





































Table 2. OLS-PCES estimations (I.A – I.C): labour market institutions.    
 (I.A) Full sample (I.B) Core (I.C) Periphery 
EmP -1.242** -0.972 -0.148 
  (0.470) (0.638) (0.554) 
AlmP -0.173*** -0.126*** -0.488*** 
  (0.021) (0.019) (0.081) 
UD 0.053** 0.028 0.010 
  (0.019) (0.025) (0.027) 
UnB 0.037** 0.080*** -0.047 
  (0.011) (0.015) (0.025) 
Cons 3.670* 1.245 9.023*** 
  (1.699) (1.387) (2.443) 
N 314 174 140 
R2 0.804 0.872 0.766 
Notes: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. Standard errors in brackets. 
 
Table 3. OLS-PCES estimations (II.A – II.C): labour market institutions and technological capability.    
 (II.A) Full sample (II.B) Core (II.C) Periphery 
EmP -1.901*** -1.411 -0.021 
  (0.513) (0.751) (0.426) 
AlmP -0.204*** -0.133*** -0.493*** 
  (0.026) (0.024) (0.044) 
UD 0.030 0.027 -0.112*** 
  (0.023) (0.024) (0.029) 
UnB 0.054*** 0.087*** -0.114*** 
  (0.011) (0.015) (0.024) 
TC -2.848*** -0.587 -16.086*** 
 (0.718) (0.825) (1.093) 
Cons 9.495*** 2.955 14.319*** 
  (2.790) (2.871) (2.151) 
N 314 174 140 
R2 0.816 0.873 0.897 















Table 4. Expanded OLS-PCES estimations. (III.A – III.C): labour market institutions and macro shock 
variables; (III.D – III.F): inclusion of the technological capability index (TC). 






















  (III.A) FS (III.B) Core (III.C) Per. (III.D) FS-TC (III.E) Core-TC (III.F) Per.-TC 
EmP 0.051 0.155 1.907*** -0.131 0.335 0.938 
  (0.242) (0.466) (0.576) (0.297) (0.542) (0.517) 
AlmP -0.086*** -0.076*** -0.155* -0.095*** -0.072** -0.322*** 
  (0.018) (0.015) (0.074) (0.021) (0.017) (0.055) 
UD 0.031* 0.054** -0.024 0.028* 0.055** -0.086** 
  (0.013) (0.017) (0.029) (0.013) (0.017) (0.030) 
UnB 0.006 0.065*** -0.122*** 0.010 0.062*** -0.134*** 
  (0.009) (0.012) (0.023) (0.009) (0.013) (0.020) 
ACCU -0.906*** -1.311*** -1.182*** -0.875*** -1.310*** -0.466** 
  (0.087) (0.151) (0.166) (0.088) (0.152) (0.150) 
LTI 0.174** -0.134 0.218** 0.172** -0.124 0.183*** 
  (0.058) (0.082) (0.070) (0.056) (0.082) (0.039) 
TFP 12.603 17.665* 6.632 12.205 18.663* 5.824 
  (7.659) (6.937) (9.234) (7.587) (6.988) (5.711) 
TOTS 3.629 -6.227 -3.434 3.722 -5.887 -0.658 
  (3.975) (4.453) (5.704) (3.992) (4.403) (4.040) 
TC       -0.616 0.262 -13.095*** 
        (0.462) (0.509) (1.375) 
Cons 6.949*** 6.783*** 9.389*** 8.058*** 5.968** 11.961*** 
  (0.999) (1.354) (2.217) (1.437) (1.908) (2.041) 
N 314 174 140 314 174 140 
R2 0.881 0.940 0.855 0.882 0.940 0.921 
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Table 5. Full OLS-PCES estimations. (IV.A – IV.C): CAPB and interaction with TC index added. 
Notes: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. Standard errors in brackets. Time series for cyclically-adjusted primary 
balances start from different years (see years in parentheses) in different countries: Austria (1991); Belgium (1985); 
Finland (1985); France (1985); Netherlands (1985); Ireland (1999), Greece (1988), Germany (1991), Portugal (1995), Italy 






  (IV.A) CAPB (IV.B) CAPB+TC (IV.C) CAPB+TC+CAPB*TC 
EmP -2.019*** -2.135*** -2.296*** 
  (0.476) (0.510) (0.516) 
AlmP -0.075*** -0.080*** -0.077*** 
  (0.013) (0.016) (0.015) 
UD 0.003 0.004 0.006 
  (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) 
UnB 0.071*** 0.075*** -0.080*** 
  (0.013) (0.014) (0.013) 
ACCU -0.472*** -0.462*** -0.464*** 
  (0.090) (0.095) (0.090) 
LTI 0.049 0.047 0.055 
  (0.044) (0.043) (0.041) 
TFP 8.551 8.335 9.356* 
  (4.769) (4.753) (4.716) 
TOTS -2.395 -2.468 -2.237 







CAPB*dper 0.073 0.072 0.219* 
 (0.055) (0.055) (0.085) 
CAPB*dcris -0.162*** -0.159*** -0.165*** 
 (0.044) (0.043) (0.043) 
TC  -0.339 -0.391 
   (0.432) (0.462) 
CAPB*TC   0.178* 
   (0.084) 
Cons 9.244*** 9.707*** 9.819*** 
  (1.190) (1.325) (1.316) 
N 251 251 251 
R2 0.860 0.860 0.862 
Wald test for d1 + d3 = 0 (p-value)         0.0025 
Wald test for d1 and d3 = 0 (p-value)    0.0000 
     
Wald test for d1 + d3 = 0 (p-value)                                                   0.0029 
Wald test for d1 and d3 = 0 (p-value)                                              0.0000 
 
Wald test for d1 + d3 = 0 (p-value)                                                                                                  0.129 
Wald test for d1 and d3 = 0 (p-value)                                                                                              0.015                                         
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Figure 1. Technology Capability index in core and peripheral eurozone countries, 1984 – 2018. 
 
Source: Authors’ computations on the basis of data from UN-COMTRADE (for export shares) and WIPO (for patents) 
datasets (2020). 
 
Figure 2. Core-periphery technological gap, 1984 – 2018. 
 
Source: Authors’ computations on the basis of data from UN-COMTRADE (for export shares) and WIPO (for patents) 
datasets (2020). 
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Figure 3. Correlation between 2008 (OECD) EmP index and change in pre-crisis (2003-2007)/post-
crisis (2010-2014) 5-year average actual unemployment.  
Source: Authors’ computations on the basis of data from AMECO (for unemployment) and OECD (for labour market 
institutions) datasets (2018). 
 
 
Figure 4. Correlation between 2008 (OECD) ALMP index and change in pre-crisis (2003-2007)/post-
crisis (2010-2014) 5-year average actual unemployment. 
 
Source: Authors’ computations on the basis of data from AMECO (for unemployment) and OECD (for labour market 











































2008 OECD Employment Protection Legislation (EPL) Index










































2008 OECD Active Labour Market Policy (ALMP) Index
delta U Linear correlation
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Figure 5. Correlation between 2008 (OECD) UnB index and change in pre-crisis (2003-2007)/post-
crisis (2010-2014) 5-year average actual unemployment. 
 
Source: Authors’ computations on the basis of data from AMECO (for unemployment) and OECD (for labour market 
institutions) datasets (2018)  
 
 
Figure 6. Correlation between 2008 (OECD) UnD index and change in pre-crisis (2003-2007)/post-
crisis (2010-2014) 5-year average actual unemployment. 
 
Source: Authors’ computations on the basis of data from AMECO (for unemployment) and OECD (for labour market 











































2008 OECD Unemployment Benefit (UnB) Index










































2008 OECD Trade Union Density (UnD) Index




Table A.1. Fischer unit root test based on augmented Dickey-Fuller test 














Table A.2. List of econometric tests for autocorrelation, heteroskedaticity and panel data cross-
sectional dependence. 
 Test Test Statistic and 
Hypothesis test 
Conclusion 
Autocorrelation Woolridge test for serial 
correlation 
H0: no first order 
correlation 
 
Prob > F = 0.0000 
There is autocorrelation in 
panel data 
Heteroskedasticity LR Maximum likelihood 
test 
H0: constant variance 
 
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
There is heteroscedasticity 
in panel data 
Cross-sectional 
Dependence 
Pearson test H0: cross sectional 
independence 
 
Pr = 0.0708 



















Table A.3. List of variables in the regression analysis: Definition, data source and time spell.   
Variable Definition Source and time period 
NAIRU Non-accelerating inflation rate of 
unemployment 
OECD, 1985 – 2014 
Labour market institutions variables 
Employment Protection Legislation 
(EmP) 
 
Strictness of employment protection, 
individual and collective dismissals (regular 
contracts)  
OECD, 1985 – 2014 
Active Labour Market Policy (ALMP) 
 
Public expenditure and participant stocks in  
LMP (in % of nominal GDP), divided by the  
unemployment rate  
OECD, 1985 – 2014  
Unemployment benefits (UnB) Net unemployment benefit replacement rate 
spliced with gross unemployment benefit 
replacement rate.  
OECD, 1985 – 2014 
Trade Union Density (UD) Share of workers affiliated to a trade union 
as percentage of the labour force 
OECD, 1985 – 2014 
Technological Capability variable 
Technology Capability Index (TC) Share of medium-to-high-tech 
manufacturing exports over total country 
exports 
 
Share of granted patents per million 
inhabitants 




WIPO, 1985 – 2014  
Macroeconomic shock variables 
Terms of Trade Shock (TOTS) Yearly growth rate in the terms of trade 
index (i.e., import share over GDP times log 
of relative import-GDP prices)  
OECD, 1985 – 2014  
Real long term interest rates (LTI) AMECO nominal long-term interest rate 
minus annual GDP deflator 
AMECO, 1985 – 2014  
TFP shock (TFP) Yearly growth rate in Total Factor 
Productivity  
AMECO, 1985 – 2014  
Demand side variables 
Capital Accumulation (ACCU) Real gross fixed capital formation/real net  
capital stock (*100) 
AMECO, 1985 – 2014  
Cyclically Adjusted Primary Budget 
Balance (CAPB) 
IMF-computed structural fiscal budget net of 
interests (as a % of potential GDP) 
IMF, 1985 – 2014 
 
